On quantum theories of the mind by Stapp, Henry P.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
97
11
06
4v
1 
 2
6 
N
ov
 1
99
7
November 25, 1997 LBNL- 40369
On Quantum Theories of the Mind ∗
Henry P. Stapp
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
University of California
Berkeley, California 94720
Abstract
Replies are given to arguments advanced in this journal that claim
to show that it is to nonlinear classical mechanics rather than quantum
mechanics that one must look for the physical underpinnings of conscious-
ness.
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In a paper with the same title as this one Alwyn Scott (1996) has given
reasons for rejecting the idea that quantum theory will play an important role
in understanding the connection between brains and consciousness. He suggests
that it is to nonlinear classical mechanics, not quantum mechanics, that we
should look for the physical underpinnings of consciousness. I shall examine
here all of his arguments, and show why each one fails.
Scott contrasts, first, the linearity of quantum theory with the nonlinearity
of certain classical theories, and notes the complexities induced by the latter.
Thus he asks: “Is not liquid water essentially different from gaseous hydro-
gen and oxygen?” Of course it is! And this difference is generated, according
to quantum field theory, by certain nonlinearities in that theory, namely the
nonlinearities in the coupled field equations. These field equations (or, more
generally, Heisenberg equations) are the direct analogs of the coupled nonlinear
equations of the corresponding classical theory, and they bring into quantum
theory the analogs of the classical nonlinearities: these nonlinearities are in no
way obstructed by the linearity of the wave equation.
To understand this point it is helpful to think of the equation of motion for
a classical statistical ensemble. It is linear: the sum of two classical statistical
statistical ensembles evolves into the sum of the two evolved ensembles. This
linearity property is a trivial consequence of the fact that the elements of the
ensembles are imaginary copies of one single physical system, in different con-
templated states, and hence they do not interact with one another. Thus in
classical statistical mechanics we have both the (generally) nonlinear equations
for coupled fields, and also the (always) linear equation for a certain statistical
quantity.
Similarly, in quantum field theory we have both the (generally) nonlinear
field equations for the coupled fields, and also the (always) linear wave equation
for a certain statistical quantity, the wave function. The fact that a group of
several atoms can behave very differently from how they would behave if each
one were alone is a consequence of the nonlinearity of the field equations: this
nonlinearity is not blocked by the linearity of the wave equation.
This blurring of the important distinction between the completely compat-
ible linear and nonlinear aspects of quantum theory is carried over into Scott’s
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discussion of solitons. The nonlinear field equations make the parts of this con-
figuration of fields hang together indefinitely, and never spread out like a wave,
as could be verified by doing experiments that probe its ‘togetherness’ by making
several measurements simultaneously at slightly separated points: the various
simultaneously existing parts of the soliton never move far apart. There is no
conflict between this stability of the soliton and the linearity of the quantum
mechanical wave equation. The wave function for the center-of-mass of the soli-
ton does eventually spread out in exactly the way that a statistical ensemble
consisting of the centers of the solitons in an ensemble of freely moving solitons
(of fixed finite extension) would do: the spreading out of the wave function of
the center-of-mass of a soliton just gives the diffusion analogous to the spreading
out of a statistical ensemble of superposed centers of mass, due to the distribu-
tion in this ensemble of velocities of these centers of mass: the extended object
itself, the soliton, does not spread out; its parts are held together by a nonlinear
effect that can be attributed to the nonlinearity of the field equations.
This obscuring by Scott of the important conceptual distinctions between
the two very different aspects of the soliton associated with the linear and non-
linear aspects of quantum theory creates, I think, a very false impression of some
significant deficiency of quantum theory with regard to the manifestation of the
analogs in quantum theory of nonlinear classical effects. No such deficiency
exists: the atoms of hydrogen and oxygen do combine, according to quantum
theory, to form water.
Failure carefully to follow through this conceptual distinction is the root of
the failures of all of Scott’s arguments.
Scott emphasizes the smallness of the spreading of the wave function of the
center-of-mass of Steffi Graf’s tennis ball. That situation involves the motion
of a large massive object, the tennis ball, relative to, say, a baseline on a large
tennis court.
A pertinent analogous situation in the brain involves the motion of a cal-
cium ion from the exit of a microchannel of diameter 1 nanometer to a target
trigger site for the release of a vesicle of neuro-transmitter into the synaptic
cleft. The irreducible Heisenberg uncertainty in the velocity of the ion as it
exits the microchannel is about 1.5 m/sec, which is smaller than its thermal
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velocity by a factor of about 4 × 10−3. The distance to the target trigger site
is about 50 nanometers. So the spreading of the wave packet is of the order
of 0.2 nanometers, which is of the order of the size of the ion itself, and of the
target trigger site. Thus the decision as to whether the vesicle is released or not,
in an individual instance, will have a large uncertainty due to the Heisenberg
quantum uncertainty in the position of the calcium ion relative to the trigger
site: the ion may hit the trigger site and release the vesicle, or it may miss the
trigger site and fail to release the vesicle. These two possibilities, yes or no, for
the release of this vesicle by this ion continue to exist, in a superposed state,
until a “reduction of the wave packet” occurs. Thus, if there is a part of the
wave function that represents a situation in which a certain particular set of
vesicles are released, due to the relevant calcium ions having been captured at
the appropriate sites, then there will be other nearby parts of the wave function
of the brain in which some or all of the relevant captures do not take place—
because, for this part of the wave function, some of the calcium ions miss their
target—and hence the corresponding vesicles are not released.
This means, more generally, in a situation that corresponds to a very large
number N of synaptc firings, that until a reduction occurs, all of the 2N possi-
ble combinations of firings and no firings will be represented with comparable
statistical weight in the wave function of the brain/body and its environment.
Different combinations of these firings and no firings can lead to very different
macroscopic behaviours of the body that is being controlled by the this brain, via
the highly nonlinear neurodynamics of the brain. Thus the collapse effectively
chooses between very different possible macroscopic bodily actions.
I do not suggest that the mechanism just cited, involving the diffusion of the
calcium ions in the nerve terminals is the only sources of significant differences
between the macroscopic consequences of the quantum and classical descrip-
tions of brain dynamics, for many other possible effects have been identified
by quantum physicists interested in brain dynamics. But this effect is directly
computable, whereas some of the others depend on complex factors that are not
yet under theoretical control, and hence could be challenged as questionable.
But this effect pertaining to calcium ions in nerve terminals gives very directly
a reason for the the inappropriateness of the example of Steffi Graf’s tennis ball:
the relevant scales are enormously different. Because of this the huge difference
3
in scales, the consequences of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and the sub-
sequent collapses that they entail, are irrelevant to the outcome of the tennis
match, but are critical to the bodily outcome of a brain activity that depends
on the action at synapses.
Scott now lists a number of reasons for believing that quantum theory is
not important in brain dynamics in a way that would relate to consciousness.
However, as I shall now explain, none of these arguments has any relevance to
the issue, which hinges on a putative connection between conscious thoughts
and quantum reduction events.
The point is this. The quantum reduction/collapse events mentioned above
are, according to orthodox Copenhagen quantum theory, closely tied to our con-
scious experiences. I believe that all physicists who suggest that consciousness
is basically a quantum aspect of nature hold that our conscious experiences are
tied to quantum collapses. The motivation for this belief is not merely that
it was only by adopting this idea that the founders of quantum theory were
able to construct a rational theory that encompassed in a unified and logically
coherent way the regularities of physical phenomena in both the classical and
quantum domains. The second powerful motivation is that this association
seems provide a natural physical basis for the unitary character of our conscious
experiences. The point is that quantum theory demands that the collapse of
the wave function represent in Dirac’s words “our more precise knowledge after
measurement”. But the representation of the increase in knowledge associated
with say, some perception, would be represented in the brain as the actualiza-
tion, as a whole unit, of a complex brain state that extends over a large part of
the brain. Collapse events of some kind are necessary to make ontological sense
out of orthodox-type quantum theory, and these events can never be pointlike
events: they must have finite extension. But once they are in principle non-
pointlike, they need not be tiny, and can quite naturally extend over an entire
physical system. The natural and necessary occurrence in quantum theory of
these extended holistic macroscopic realities that enter as inseparable and effi-
cacious units into the quantum dynamics—and which, according to the physical
theory itself, are associated with sudden increments in our knowledge—seems
to put the physical and psychological aspects of nature into a much closer and
more natural correspondence with each other in quantum theory than in classi-
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cal mechanics, in which every large-scale thing is, without any loss, completely
decomposable, both ontologically and dynamically, into its tiny parts.
Scott’s first reason for claiming quantum theory to be unimportant to mind
pertains to the speading of wave packets in molecular dynamics. That effect
was just considered, and the crucial spreading of the calcium ion wave packets
in nerve terminals was shown to be large compared to the ion size, contrary to
Scott’s estimate.
Scott then considers a subject he has worked on: polarons. He says the
the effect of the quantum corrections is to degrade the global coherence of the
classical polaron. But this “degrading” is not just some fuzzying-up of the
situation: it is the very thing that is of interest and importance here. In the case
of a body/brain this “degrading” is, more precisely, the separation of the wave
function into branches representing various classical describable possibilities.
However, only one of these classical possibilities is experienced in the mind
associated with this body/brain. Quantum theory in its present form is mute
on the question of which of these possibilities is experienced: only a statistical
rule is provided. But then what is it that undoes this huge (in our case) degrading
that the linear wave equation generates. It is not the classical nonlinearities,
for the quantum analogs of these nonlinearities are built into the part of the
quantum dynamics that creates the superposition of the classically describable
possibilities: they are built into the Schroedinger equation. A collapse, which is
the putative physical counterpart of the conscious experience, is a different effect
that does not enter into the Schroedinger equation. Nor does it enter at all into
the classical approximation to quantum theory. In that approximation there
are no Heisenberg uncertainties or indeterminacies, and hence no collapses, and
hence from the persective of the encompassing and more basic quantum theory,
no physical counterparts of our conscious experiences.
His next two points concern the difficulty of maintaining “quantum coher-
ence” in a warm, wet brain. The brain is a complex structure with built-in
energy pumps. The question of whether or not long-range quantum coherence
could be maintained is difficult to settle theoretically. Some explorations have
been made (Vitiello, 1995), but the matter is not yet settled. On the other
hand, my theory yields important quantum effects that are not wiped out by
decohence effects and that could lead to the evolution of a dynamically effica-
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cious consciousness in coordination with evolution of brains without requiring
any long-range quantum coherence (Stapp, 1997a,b).
Scott’s next item is the theory for the propagation of an action potential
along a nerve fiber. He points out that this propagation is well described by
the classical Hodgkin-Huxley equation. But even among neuroscientists who
accept classical mechanics as an adequate foundation for brain dynamics there
is a recognition that although in some situations the parallel processing structure
produces reliable and essentially deterministic behaviors of groups of neurons, in
spite of the essentially stochastic character of the the distribution of individual
pulses on the individual neurons, in other cases there are long-range correlations
in the timings of pulses. One can expect in cases where thermal and other
classical fluctuation effectively cancel, in such a way as to give reliable and
deterministic behaviors, that the quantum effects associated with collapses will
probably have no major macroscopic consequences. But in cases where long-
range correlations of pulse timings arise, the precise details of these timings must
be controlled in part by stochastic variables even in a completely classical model
that generallly conforms to, say, the Hodgkin-Huxley equation. In these more
delicate situations there is ample room for the large-scale effects associated with
quantum collapses of brain-wide quantum states to play a decisive dynamical
role within the framework of possibilities compatible with the classical Hodgkin-
Huxley equations. Indeed, the actualization of global brain states would be
expected produce fine-tuned global regularities that classical mechanics could
not account for.
Scott’s final point is about Schroedinger’s cat. He says the Schroedinger
equation cannot be constructed because the cat does not conserve energy. But
the usual assumption in these studies of the quantum mind-brain is that quan-
tum theory is universally valid, in the sense that the Schroedinger equation is
the equation of motion for the entire universe, in absence of collapse events.
Partial systems are defined by integrating over the other degrees of freedom,
and their energies are not conserved.
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